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   1 
Introduction 
In recent years, the focus in the study of household behavior has shifted from the household as a 
homogeneous unit (the unitary model) to the different individuals comprising the household (collective 
models).  The unitary model invokes the idea of ‘altruism’ or ‘benevolent dictator’ to aggregate 
preferences whereas the collective models of household decision-making explicitly recognize and model 
the individualistic elements in the household within a collective framework (Strauss and Beegle 1996).  
Collective models make the assumption of Pareto efficiency in intrahousehold distribution (Chiappori 
1988, 1992) but do not impose a particular solution concept.  The collective models include the 
cooperative Nash-bargaining model (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981) and a subset 
of noncooperative models.  The unitary model is shown to be a special case of the collective model.   
The concept of bargaining power plays a crucial role in the collective model, which predicts that 
the household allocation process and resultant outcomes will reflect the bargaining power of the 
individual (Quisumbing and de la Briere 2000).  Individuals derive bargaining power from multiple 
sources, many of which correspond to the alternative options available to them in the event of 
withdrawing from the agreement.   
Empirical studies that have tested for the validity of the collective model against the unitary 
model have used varying economic measures as proxies for bargaining power.  These include income 
shares (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995), ownership of current assets (Doss 1996), inherited assets 
(Quisumbing 1994), assets at marriage (Thomas et al. 1997), unearned or nonlabor income (Thomas 
1990, 1993, Schultz 1990), credit (Pitt and Khandker 1996) and exogenous policy shifts (Lundberg and 
Pollak 1997).  The results of the tests indicate that differential control over resources has different impacts 
on the welfare of household members.  The evidence suggests that resources controlled by women have a 
greater impact on the health and welfare of children (Strauss and Beegle 1996).  Most of the proxies for 
bargaining power used in the empirical studies suffer from a problem of endogeneity.  Spouse-specific 
labor income is not appropriate because it reflects their participation and labor supply decisions.  
Nonearned income is typically assumed as exogenous, but should actually be viewed as an endogenous 
choice if it represents returns on an individual’s life-cycle savings.   
Research Statement  
The research undertaken in this paper focuses on two aspects of household decision making, labor 
allocation and consumption expenditures in agricultural households, using the framework of the Nash-
bargaining model and the agricultural household model.  Access to credit is used to operationalize the 
concept of ‘resource control’ affecting a woman’s bargaining power.  Recognizing that women are a   2 
diverse population who are faced with differing constraints and opportunities this study also attempts to 
understand if the choices made by women living in male-headed households are different from the 
choices made by women living in female-headed households.   
Studies of labor supply in the intrahousehold framework are relatively rare, with the exceptions 
being Schultz (2001), Mendoza (1997), and Pitt and Khandker (1996).  Men and women in rural Malawi 
allocate their labor between the following activities: (i) self-employment on own farm; (ii) off-farm self-
employment; (iii) off-farm wage employment; and (iv) household activities.  In this study, the focus is on 
off-farm self-employment work and own farm work for men and women.
1   In Malawi, formal 
agricultural credit programs lend in-kind and the programs that target women typically lend for self-
employment activities.  However, there is some concern that credit is often not used for the purpose for 
which it is given, but is diverted for other uses, mainly for consumption purposes (Rahman 1999, 
Muhumuza 1997).  The findings of this study will help understand if indeed access to credit influences 
work choices within the household.  In addition, the study will also illustrate the effect of informal credit 
on participation decisions, if any.  Furthermore, little is known about the effect of an individual’s access 
to credit on the labor allocation patterns of other members in the household, specifically the effect of an 
individual’s access on the spouse’s labor allocation decisions.   
Beyond affecting labor supply, there may be spillover effects of access to credit on household 
consumption and household welfare in general.  Does the increase in bargaining power for women due to 
their having access to credit translate into differential expenditure patterns by the household?  Within the 
context of a household model, it is reasonable to assume that apart from bargaining over labor supply, 
household members may also bargain over commodity consumption (Thomas and Chen 1993).  Studies 
have shown that a greater share of nonlabor income controlled by women has positive implications for 
household welfare (Strauss and Beegle 1996).  This study explores the impact of access to credit 
(differentiated by sector) on household expenditure patterns for male-headed and female-headed 
households.  
Sampling Procedure and Data Characteristics 
The data set from Malawi, ‘Financial Markets and Household Food Security, 1995’, used in this 
research is available from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), based in Washington 
D.C.  The data are from a household rural finance survey of 404 households in 45 villages in Malawi 
                                                 
1   Participation in off-farm wage employment was not modeled because very few women in the sample 
participate in the activity.  Furthermore, the data do not provide information on hours worked on household tasks, 
which makes it impossible to estimate labor allocation to household activities.  The concept of participation as a 
dichotomous variable is not a useful measure of involvement in household activities.  Understandably, it is very high 
and is close to 100 percent for the women in our sample.     3 
spread over five districts (see Figure 1 for the location of the survey sites in Malawi).  The survey was 
conducted by IFPRI in collaboration with the Bunda College of Agriculture, University of Malawi.  The 
sample of 404 households is from five districts of Malawi:  Dowa, Mangochi, Nkhotakota, Rumphi and 
Dedza.  Fifty percent of the sample is comprised of households who are members of the credit programs, 
with the remaining sample comprised of non-participating households.  The non-participants are further 
equally divided between those who never received credit from an organization and defaulters and, hence, 
are no longer eligible for loans.  The non-participants are drawn from the same villages as the 
participants.  The four programs considered in the study are the Malawi Rural Finance Company 
(MRFC), Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF), Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO), 
and the Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for Rural Women (PMERW).   
Households were interviewed in a three-round household survey with a recall period of up to two 
years for some data.  The first round was conducted in February – April 1995, the second round in July – 
August 1995, and the last round in November – December 1995.  The survey was conducted at three 
levels: the household level, community level and credit group level.  The household-level survey, 
comprised of seven modules, was administered in all three rounds.  The seven modules are (i) 
demographics, (ii) crop and livestock incomes, (iii) asset ownership and transactions, (iv) food and non-
food expenditure, (v) credit and savings, (vi) non-farm income and time allocation, and (vii) 
anthropometric measures.   
Access to Credit 
In this paper we make a distinction between access to credit and participation in the credit 
market.  The access to credit variable is defined following the methodology outlined in Diagne and Zeller 
(2001).  A household has access to credit from a particular source if it is able to borrow from that source.  
A household participates if it actually borrows from that source of credit.  Thus, a household can have 
access but choose not to borrow, i.e., does not participate in the credit market.  A non-participating 
household that has access will still benefit if the knowledge of access increases the household’s ability to 
bear risk.  This in turn will encourage the household to experiment with riskier, but potentially high-
yielding technology (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990).  The ability to borrow will also alleviate the need for 
accumulation of assets that mainly serve as precautionary savings, yielding poor or negative returns 
(Deaton 1991).   
Most previous studies estimate the marginal effects of either the amount of credit borrowed or 
membership in a program as measures of impact of access to credit.  The main shortcomings of this 
approach are related to the substitutability of credit and the endogeneity of program placement and 
membership.  Using the amount of credit borrowed or received as a measure of impact of credit   4 
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relies on rather strong assumptions: first, all households in the program were credit constrained when they 
received credit; second, the program was the only source of credit; and finally, they had no resources to 
self finance even a part of their investment (Feder et al. 1990, as noted in Diagne and Zeller 2001).  In 
addition, Diagne and Zeller (2001) note two other reasons where the use of the amount borrowed is not 
appropriate:  (i) households may have access to credit, but decide not to borrow because it was not an 
optimal strategy for them; (ii) households may receive large amounts of credit with negligible marginal 
impact.  In both situations outlined above, using the amount borrowed does not fully capture the positive 











   5 
The problem of endogeneity of program placement and membership in the program can be 
adequately dealt with by ensuring appropriate survey design, sample selection and econometric 
techniques (Murdoch 1997, Pitt and Khandker 1996, Heckman and Smith 1995).  Then the estimated 
partial effect of the membership status variable correctly measures the average impact of the program on 
welfare outcomes.  However, Diagne and Zeller (2001) argue that the membership status variable does 
not measure the impact of access to formal credit for the following reasons:  first, most credit programs 
are not focused on credit alone.  They provide educational services like literacy training, family planning, 
training for income generating activities and so on.  Hence, in the use of program impacts, we will not be 
able to separate out the effects due to credit received and the effects due to the educational services 
provided (Pitt and Khandker 1996).  Second, access to credit is not necessarily automatic for members of 
a credit program.  Many group-based credit programs lend only to a certain percent of the group at any 
time (Diagne and Zeller 2001).   
The extent of access is determined by the maximum amount the person can borrow from that 
source.  This is referred to as the person’s credit limit or credit line from that source.  In the IFPRI data 
set, access to credit is measured separately for all adult household members, i.e., for those over 17 years 
of age.  In each round, information was collected from each adult household member on the maximum 
amount they could borrow during the recall period by the sector of the credit market (formal or informal 
source of credit).  This question was asked of all respondents: those who were involved in a loan 
transaction as a borrower, those who were not involved in any loan transaction, and those whose loan 
request had been rejected.  Thus, the data set provides information on the formal and informal credit limit 
of each adult member for all three rounds.  In this paper we define access to credit for both formal and 
informal credit separately.  An individual is said to have access to formal credit or to informal credit if 
he/she enjoys a strictly positive credit limit for formal credit or for informal credit, respectively.   
Empirical Framework 
Sampling Framework:  Choice-Based Sampling 
As discussed previously, due to low participation in credit programs in Malawi, a stratified 
sample selection procedure was followed.  The stratification was along the program membership status 
variable with random selection within each stratum.  Since the stratifying variable is endogenous, this is a 
choice-based sampling procedure.  In a situation like Malawi, choice-based sampling is more cost 
efficient than random sampling and with the use of appropriate estimators yields estimates with better 
statistical properties (Diagne and Zeller 2001).  However, we need to correct for the corresponding bias in 
the estimation process caused by the choice-based sampling procedure.  The estimation procedure follows 
a two-step approach based on the methodology in Diagne and Zeller (2001) to correct for the bias in   6 
estimation that arises due to the choice-based sampling.  The probability choices of the household with 
regard to membership status, corrected for choice-based sampling, are estimated in the first step.  The 
outcome equations are then estimated in the second step, using the corrected probability choices from the 
first step as weights.  The models estimated in the second step estimate the impact of access to credit on 
work choices and on consumption decisions within the household.   
First-Step Estimation:  Multinomial Logit Model 
In the first step, a three-alternative multinomial logit model is used for estimation of the corrected 
probability choices of the household.  The three alternatives are specified as:  (i) never participated in a 
credit program (j = 0), (ii) current member of any credit program (j = 1), and (iii) joined a credit program 
and then dropped out of the program, i.e., past member (j = 2).
2  Due to the restriction of mutual 
exclusivity, each household can belong to only one of the three alternatives.  The probability choices for 
household i are specified as:  
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where j = 0, 1 ,2.  For the purpose of identification, we impose the normalization 0 0 = β , and 








































where j = 1, 2.  
 
The model is estimated as full information maximum likelihood (FIML) using the Manski and 
Lerman (1977) weighted-exogenous-sample maximum likelihood (WESML) estimator to correct for 
choice-based sampling (Greene 2000).  The WESML estimator requires that the true population 
proportions be known.  If  0 p ,  1 p , and  2 p  are the sample proportions and  0 ω ,  1 ω , and  2 ω  are the true 
                                                 
2   Diagne and Zeller (2001) estimate a four-alternative nested multinomial logit model with two levels: choice 
is between participation vs. non-participation at the first level and at the second level (reached only if participation is 
chosen at the first level), the choice is between being a (i) member of MRFC, (ii) member of a second program, or 
(iii) past member.       7 
population proportions corresponding to the three alternatives, then the estimator is obtained by 
maximizing the weighted log-likelihood 





i x q F w L β ′ =∑
=
          [ 3 ]  
where  
 
) / ( ) / ( ) / ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 p y p y p y w i i io i ω ω ω + + =        [ 4 ]  
 
The results of the multinomial logit model are presented in the Appendix, Table A1.   
Second-step Estimation:  Credit and Labor Allocation 
The IFPRI data, collected in three waves (rounds one, two and three) in 1995 enables the use of 
panel data techniques.  Panel data sets possess several advantages over cross-section data sets.  Most 
importantly, the use of panel data enables the researcher to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
level of the individual, household, community or specific time period.  In this study the use of panel data 
helps to control for unobserved household and individual heterogeneity that influence participation 
decisions, particularly in the off-farm self-employment sector (see Skoufias 1993 for an application of a 
time allocation study using panel data).  The basic model for panel data is: 
it it i it x y ε β α + ′ + =            [ 5 ]  
with  [] []
2 , 0 ε σ ε ε = = it it Var E  
where i = 1,…,n and t = 1,…,T,  it x  is a vector of explanatory variables and  i α is a time-invariant effect 
specific to each cross-sectional unit i.  The treatment of  i α leads to two different approaches: the fixed-
effects approach and the random effects approach.  Following Simler (1994) and Ilahi (2001) the random-
effects specification is used in the analysis.  The alternative specification of fixed-effects is not 
appropriate for this study because of the small number of observations over time.  In the fixed-effects 
approach, a dummy variable has to be introduced as a regressor for each individual in the sample, which 
would severely limit the degrees of freedom in the sample.  In addition, time invariant regressors are 
eliminated in the differencing inherent in the fixed-effects estimator.
3  However, it may also be possible 
that there are no random effects in this particular data set in which case, the estimate of ρ  will not be 
statistically different from zero.  This implies that there is no additional information to be gained from the 
knowledge that observations are repeated over time, and that a pooled model is the appropriate 
                                                 
3   In addition, Greene (2000) notes that the fixed effects approach, while appropriate for the logit model, 
cannot be used for the probit model.     8 
specification.  Lagrange multiplier tests are used to test the significance of ρ  in the models (Greene 
2000, Greene 1998, Simler 1994).   
An estimation issue that must be considered is the potential for endogeneity in the model.  There 
are several reasons why access to credit may be potentially endogenous to the participation decisions of 
individuals within the household.  The first explanation is related to the idea that credit program 
participation may be endogenous, which makes it likely that access to formal credit is also endogenous.  
Pitt and Khandker (1996) argue that program participation is endogenous due to the non-random 
placement of credit programs, and common village-specific, household-specific and individual-specific 
unobservable characteristics.  In addition, the unobserved attributes are likely to affect both credit demand 
and the outcomes of interest.  Examples of such attributes at the village level are prices, availability of 
infrastructure, agro-climatic conditions; at the household level these include household environment, 
specific traditions and customs; and at the individual level are health endowments and entrepreneurial 
ability.  Apart from influencing the demand for credit and the outcome of interest, the unobserved 
attributes also influence the supply of credit (Khandker and Faruqee 2001).  This point is particularly 
relevant for access to informal credit.  Informal lenders are comprised mainly of relatives, friends, 
neighbors, traders or landlords.  They are likely to be well acquainted with the characteristics of the 
borrower or the borrowing household that can affect repayment of the loan, thus influencing their lending 
decision.   
The potential endogeneity of access to credit to the outcome of interest implies that the random-
effects probit cannot be implemented as such without correcting for endogeneity.
4  In the panel model, the 
endogeneity correction follows the two-step approach (pseudo-likelihood estimator) that yields bias-
corrected estimates as detailed in Orme (1997).  Correction for endogenous variables in a probit model in 
a panel data setting is a technique that is still evolving (see Arendt 2001 for a discussion of endogeneity in 
limited dependent variable panel data models).  The two-step estimator proposed by Orme (1997) is 
implemented in the spirit of a conditional maximum likelihood approach and its asymptotic validity 
requires fairly strict distributional assumptions (see also Audas et al., 2000 for another application).  If the 
original equation is written as: 
                                                 
4   We tested for exogeneity of the access variables (overall, formal and informal) using the two-step approach 
suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988), and outlined in Wooldridge (2002).  The test results indicated that 
exogeneity is rejected in a number of specific model tests, but not in others and, hence, all models are corrected for 
potential endogeneity of the access to credit variable.   
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where i = 1,…,n and t = 1,…,T,  it x  is a vector of explanatory (exogenous) regressors and 
1
it y  is the 
binary endogenous regressor,  i z  is a vector of strictly exogenous instruments, and  i α and  it ε as described 
above.  It is assumed that  i η is uncorrelated with  i z  and  it x .  
The two-step estimation procedure is:   
(i)  Obtain the residual from a probit specification for 
1
it y  on the exogenous instruments 
( i z ) including a constant  
(ii)  Add the residual to the original regressor set ( it x , 
1
it y ) and estimate the random-effects probit 
model.   
Using simulations Orme (1997) finds that the corrected model yields t-ratios that are reliable, 
while inferences based on the uncorrected model are fairly misleading.  The instruments used are a 
combination of membership status of the household (past, present or current member) in a credit program, 
area average value of all assets, area average share of livestock in total value of assets, area percent of 
male-headed households, distance in kilometers to the home of the individual’s parents, percent of heads 
migrating from another village, percent of adults with a second occupation, area average of years of 
schooling of adults,  Friends, relatives, neighbors and shopkeepers are all potential lenders for an 
individual and we expect that having a second occupation will increase their lending capacity.  Living in a 
poorer village is likely to decrease access to informal credit.  Having a marketplace in the village gives 
scope for greater interaction with shopkeepers and traders, and hence, a better opportunity to exploit 
informal networks as a source of credit.  A similar argument is relevant for the number of wholesale 
traders visiting the village.   
Second-step Estimation:  Credit and Consumption Expenditures 
Following Quisumbing and de la Briere (2000), Doss (1996), Handa (1996) and Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995), the expenditure shares are estimated using the standard Engle curve formulation extended 
to include household demographic composition and have the following functional form,   10 
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where  i w  is the budget share of the 
th i good.  Including the logarithm of household size permits the 
effects of household scale to be flexible (Thomas and Chen 1993).  Total household expenditure is a 
proxy for household income.  Following Deaton 1997, household composition is incorporated into the 
model by including nine demographic groups based on a disaggregation of the household by age and 
gender.  Since the model controls for total household size, the estimated coefficients on the demographic 
composition variables are to be interpreted as the effect of an increase in the number of individuals in that 
group relative to an equal reduction in the number of individuals in the reference group (men between 15 
and 65 years of age in this model).  Agricultural land (in acres) owned by the household is included in the 
model to control for farm size in the estimations.   
With the exception of the food category, households report zero expenditure in all of the other 
seven categories ranging from 5 percent (energy shares) to 92 percent (social activities).  To account for 
the censoring of the dependent variable, the Tobit model is used to estimate the budget shares in these 
seven categories, while the OLS model is used to estimate the budget share equation for food.  The 
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σ π     [9] 
where the two parts correspond to the classical regression for the nonlimit observations and the relevant 
probabilities for the limit observations, respectively.   
The potential endogeneity of total household expenditure to the budget shares was tested in all of 
the expenditure equations.  If total household expenditure is endogenous to the outcome of interest then 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) and simultaneous-Tobit models (Amemiya 1974) are estimated instead of 
the OLS and the simple Tobit model, respectively.  The test of endogeneity for food shares in the OLS 
model was implemented using a regression-based variant of the Hausman test for endogeneity.  The 
regression-based test was suggested by Hausman and is asymptotically equivalent to the original form of 
the Hausman test (Wooldridge 2002).  The test for endogeneity in the Tobit framework is performed by   11 
estimating the simultaneous-Tobit model (Greene 1998, Blundell and Smith 1986):  The test results 
indicated that for male-headed households, total household expenditure was endogenous in the same set 
of budget equations in all models for both the access to credit–expenditure models and the land 
ownership–expenditure models.  Total household expenditure was endogenous in the food, energy, health 
and nondurables equations and is instrumented only in those equations in the presented results.  This 
result is similar to the study by Handa (1996), who finds that total expenditure is endogenous in only the 
food and the adult wear equations.  For female-headed households, total household expenditure was not 
endogenous in any of the budget share equations.  The exclusion restrictions were a combination of 
household and village characteristics:  availability of clean water to the household, availability of 
sanitation facilities (latrine), if the household used iodized salt, number of wells and low-lift pumps in the 
village, distance to the post office and distance to a commercial bank.   
Results 
Credit and Labor Allocation 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Participation in off-farm self-employment activity (dichotomous variable) is defined from the 
self-employment module of the data set.  Participation in farm work (dichotomous variable) is defined 
from the time allocation module of the data set.  Climate plays an important role in determining farm 
work and consequently off-farm work patterns in Malawi.  There are two main seasons: the dry season 
and the wet season.  The dry season is from May to October and the wet season from November to April.  
Most smallholder agriculture is rain-fed agriculture and is grown in the wet season (Simler 1994).  Land 
preparation, a predominantly male activity, takes place mainly in October.  With early rainfall in October 
and November it is also the time of planting, a peak labor demand period for all farmers.  During the 
months of November to December, women are primarily engaged in weeding and planting the household 
dimba lands (garden plots, mainly used for growing vegetables).  They also spend time caring for sick 
individuals in the household, as it is the time for diseases and high morbidity due to the onset of the rainy 
season and lack of food.  It is likely that the incidence of off-farm self-employment will be low in the wet 
season due to the conflict with farming activities and the labor constraints faced by most small farmers.   
The labor participation rates for our sample are consistent with the seasonality patterns in Malawi 
(Table 1).  As anticipated, it is seen that off-farm work is highest in the male-headed households in round 
two (dry season) and lowest in round one (first half of the wet season).  In fact, more than 50 percent of 
those reporting some off-farm activity in our sample reported that off-farm work conflicts with farm work   12 
during the months of October to March and in the event of a conflict, they would reduce their time 
allocation to the self-employment activity.  It is interesting that wife’s participation in farm work in round 
one (second half of the wet season)
5 is lower than their husband’s participation in the same period, while 
in round three we find that they show similar work patterns.  In the months of February to April (round 
one), some crops are ready for harvesting – men are usually more involved than women in the harvesting 
and marketing of crops, helping them to retain control over the farm income.   
Table 1  Participation in off-farm self-employment and farm work, by round of survey
Overall Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Male-headed households % % % %
Men
    Farm work (own farm) 63.8 70.6 49.6 73.1
    Off-farm self-employment 22.0 13.0 28.3 25.6
Women
    Farm work (own farm) 48.8 42.2 31.6 79.1
    Off-farm self-employment 15.4 12.4 19.5 13.9
Number of observations 698 244 241 213
Female-headed households
Women
    Farm work (own farm) 46.5 44.1 21.2 74.3
    Off-farm self-employment 24.8 13.6 29.0 31.8
Number of observations 255 87 86 82
Source: Based on own calculations from DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
 
 
Examining the type of off-farm self-employment activities shows a limited range of activities, 
with two activities (three for men) accounting for more than 60 percent of enterprises operated (Table 2).  
Buckley (1996), in an analysis of the Malawi Mudzi Fund, points out that a limited range of activities 
suggests a limited resource base and a lack of income-generating activities in Malawi and argues for the 
need to diversify this base.  In fact, agricultural-related activities are predominant forms of self-
employment accounting for 50 percent of the enterprises operated by men, 78 percent of the enterprises 
                                                 
5   This is categorized as the second half of the wet season, because of the structure of the survey – the recall 
period for farm work is the past 2 days, essentially during the time of round one.     13 
operated by women and 92 percent of those operated by female heads.
6  These enterprises depend on 
agricultural spin-offs, have low entry barriers and low start-up costs (Reardon 1997).  Beer brewing is by 
far the most prevalent activity and is exclusively undertaken by women.  Tellegen (1997) notes several 
reasons why this activity is predominant among women.  Beer brewing is a low-skilled and low-
investment activity for which inputs are easily acquired.  The process involves collection of water and 
firewood, the grinding of maize and cooking – all of which are perceived as ‘female activities’.  An 
additional advantage for women is that beer brewing can be combined with other domestic activities, 
since beer can be processed and sold within the compound.  Other studies in Sub-Saharan Africa find that 
female-operated enterprises require less investment, have low returns and are operated for only part of the 
year (Tellegen 1997, Simler 1994).  About 28 percent of the male heads participate in weaving, a 
traditional male activity.  Produce selling accounts for more than 20 percent of off-farm self-employment 
among all individuals and accounts for 49 percent in female-headed households.   
Table 2 also summarizes the extent of involvement of individuals (heads and spouses) in the off-
farm enterprise, differentiated by the ownership of the enterprise.  Women in male-headed households 
who own an off-farm enterprise are highly involved in the operation of the enterprise, either by 
themselves or jointly with their husbands.  The head shows a greater involvement, as compared to the 
spouse, in the operation of the enterprises irrespective of ownership status.  In the data set, those 
individuals who worked on an off-farm self-employment activity were also asked, “Has the business 
changed your status in the family?” and “Has the business changed your status in the village?”  
Individuals who felt their status had improved were asked to explain the reason for this increase.
 7  
Among those who responded, 97 percent of the men and 78 percent of the women felt their status within 
the household had improved as a result of their self-employment activity.  A smaller proportion (47 
percent of the men and 32 percent of the women) also perceived an increase in their status in the 








                                                 
6   The enterprises in this category are grocery, poultry, produce selling and fishing.   
7   It would have been interesting to know the reasons why the respondent felt their status had not improved as 
a result of owning the enterprise.  Unfortunately, this information was not collected in the data set.     14 
Characteristics of self-employment businesses
Men Women N Women N
Type of business % % %
Grocery 5.3 2.6 119
a 2.2 43
Bakery 0 8.5 77
b 2.4
Carpentry 8.3 -- --
Beer brewing -- 30.2 26.7
Poultry -- 2.6 --
Produce selling 21.1 32.0 48.8
Weaving 27.7 -- --
Pottery -- 5.1 --
Fishing 23.9 10.2 14.4
Services (tailoring, repairs) 0.0 -- --
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0
Member who runs the business
Self 72.94 70.47 97.1
Spouse 21.76 23.31
Husband and wife together 2.20 5.72
Wife and dependants -- 0.32
Non-members of the household 3.1 0.2
Member who does most of the work 
Self 79.37 74.71 96.0 42
Spouse 9.23 24.28
Husband and wife together 8.1 0.52
Head and dependents 0.08 --
Wife and dependents -- 0.31
Non-members of the household 3.25 0.2
Has the business changed your status in the family?




Has the business changed your status in the village?




All statistics are weighted using the household sampling weights.  
A small percent operated more than one enterprise.  It is included in the calculation of type of business.
a: men; b: women
Table 2  Characteristics of off-farm self-employment enterprises
Household type
Male-headed  Female-headed 
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Econometric Analysis  
 
Participation in off-farm self-employment:  Table 3 presents the results of the random-effects probit 
model for women (spouses) corrected for endogeneity of access to formal credit and informal credit.  The 
estimate of rho  ) (ρ  in both the models suggests that unobserved individual heterogeneity is important in 
determining off-farm self-employment decisions.  The hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero is 
rejected, indicating that the models have significant explanatory power.  It is seen that access to formal 
credit as well as informal credit increases the probability of participation in off-farm self-employed 
activities for women in male-headed households.  The positive impact of access to formal credit is 
consistent with expectations, as most formal institutions that target women are supposed to lend only for 
off-farm self-employment activities.  The positive and significant effect of informal credit on off-farm 
activities is somewhat surprising as informal credit is usually considered as flowing towards consumption 
smoothing or short-term emergency expenditures within the household.  However, it is possible that some 
women may not have access to formal credit and, hence, turn to kinship ties to finance their off-farm 
work.  In addition, even those with access to formal credit may rely on informal networks to supplement 
their capital requirements for their enterprises because formal credit is sometimes inadequate.
8   
An increase in age increases the probability of women’s participation in off-farm work, while 
some primary education seems to have no effect on their off-farm participation.  Reardon (1997), in a 
review of off-farm employment in several African countries, notes that women are usually restricted to 
low-skill activities.  It is quite possible that the level of education does not really matter for participation 
in low-skill activities.  The number of children under 5 years of age in the household does not seem to 
affect women’s participation in off-farm work.  It is usually the case that young children have a negative 
effect on women’s off-farm wage work unless older children or other female adults help out with caring 
for children.  But self-employment is typically more flexible and may take place close to the home and, 
hence, may not interfere with women’s child care duties.   
The location dummy variables in the models for Rumphi and Dedza are significant and negative, 
implying that the probability of off-farm participation is higher for women in the Mangochi (reference) 
district in southern Malawi.  This is consistent with the USAID (1999) report that finds that off-farm 
activity has a greater contribution to total income in the south than in the north or central regions of 
Malawi.  The southern region is more densely populated, which is likely to put pressure on the limited 
agricultural land available and force people to seek employment opportunities outside the farm sector.   
                                                 
8   When focus groups were conducted in Malawi, several not-so-poor households complained that the credit 
provided was not sufficient, particularly for off-farm income-generating activities.     16 
The off-farm participation and access to credit models for female heads has fewer significant 
variables than the models for women in male-headed households (Table 4). According to the likelihood-
ratio statistic, the estimate of rho ( ) ρ  is significant at the 2.5 percent level and the hypothesis that all 
explanatory variables except the constant are jointly equal to zero is rejected.  It is seen that while access 
to credit does not influence female head’s participation in off-farm work, female heads from wealthier 
households are more likely to participate in self-employment.  This possibly reflects the fact that poorer 
households concentrate on their farm work to maintain food security, but once having achieved a 
minimum level, they now turn to diversifying their income sources.  The district dummies show a similar 
effect to that of the women in male-headed households’ models.   
Turning to the men’s models it is seen that once again the use of a panel approach is justified – 
the estimated coefficient of rho ( ) ρ  is significant at the 10 percent level and the models have significant 
explanatory power (Table 5).  Access to informal credit increases men’s likelihood of participation in off-
farm activities, but access to formal credit has no impact on their off-farm participation.  Formal credit 
given to men is mainly in the form of agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizers) and hence, is not likely to 
encourage self-employment activities.  On the other hand, informal credit enhances off-farm work 
participation, possibly due to the necessity of supplementing and diversifying household income sources.   
For men, age has a negative and significant effect on participation in off-farm work.  This is 
likely to reflect a greater likelihood of own-farm work, with less self-employment off farm, with 
increasing age.  Education has the expected positive effect, implying there are greater returns for educated 
men than uneducated men in rural areas.  An increase in household wealth as indicated by the total value 
of household assets increases the likelihood of men’s participation in off-farm self-employment.  An 
increase in the number of adults in the household reduces men’s probability of participation in self-
employed off-farm work.  Similar results were obtained by Simler (1994) for both men’s and women’s 
participation in off-farm employment in northern Malawi.  Since Malawi is land constrained, it was 
expected that increases in household size will push more household members to participate in off-farm 
self-employment.  In fact, the number of older children in the household (between 10 and 17 years of age) 
seems to free men from other work to participate in off-farm work.  This is likely due to older children 
substituting for adult labor in household work.   
The location variables show the same effect as in the women’s models: the district dummy 
variables for Rumphi and Dedza are negative and significant, implying that the probability of off-farm 
participation is higher for men in the Mangochi (reference) district in southern Malawi.  The round 
dummy variables show a reasonable pattern suggesting that men are less likely to work off-farm in round 
one as compared to round two and round three.  The period of off-farm activity considered in round one is   17 
in the first half of the wet season (October / November to April).  This is the time of land preparation, a 
predominantly male activity and a time of planting, which is a busy time for all farmers.   
Participation in own-farm work:  In the women’s (spouses and female heads) access to credit and 
participation in own-farm work models, the estimate of rho ( ) ρ  was not significant, i.e., the random-
effects specification was rejected for the data.  Hence, the models were estimated as probit models, 
corrected for endogeneity of access to credit.  For women in male-headed households, participation in 
farm work is negatively influenced by access to formal or informal credit (Table 6).  This complements 
the earlier result (Table 3) that showed an increase in participation in self-employment with access to 
formal or informal credit.  Although the overall model for female heads shows significant explanatory 
power (Table 7), only the Dedza district dummy variable and the survey round dummy variables are 
statistically different from zero.   
The district dummies are mostly positive and significant, implying decreased participation in 
farm work in the Mangochi district.  The location results tie in with the explanation of the off-farm self 
employment models and reflect the higher population density in Mangochi and the consequent limited 
availability of arable land.  In comparison to round one (February to April), women (spouses and female 
heads) are less likely to participate in farm work in round two (July to August), but more likely to 
participate in farm work during round three (November and December).  The results are plausible, as 
during the months of November to December, women are primarily engaged in weeding and planting the 
household dimba lands, while farming activity is typically slow during the dry season (May to October).   
Access to either formal or informal credit does not influence men’s participation in farm work 
(Table 8).  The lack of significance of formal access seems rather counter intuitive, as men primarily 
receive agricultural inputs as formal credit.  While formal credit may increase men’s labor intensity in 
farm work, it is less likely to push them over the ‘participate or not participate’ threshold.  An increase in 
intensity or hours worked on the farm is not captured in the labor participation model.  It is interesting to 
note that their wives’ access to formal credit actually reduces the men’s participation in farm work.  This 
suggests that as women get access to formal credit and are involved in self-employment activities, men 
are also contributing their labor to their wives’ enterprises.  This is an interesting result and suggests the 
importance of off-farm income to the rural household economy.
9  Recall from the models discussed 
previously that men’s access to informal credit also had the effect of increasing their off-farm 
participation.    
Age and education variables complement the results of the off-farm participation models 
for men (see Table 5), with an increase in age increasing their own-farm participation and an 
                                                 
9   It can also suggest that men are taking control of their wives’ enterprise or appropriating their wives’ credit.     18 
increase in education decreasing the likelihood of participating in farm work.  Once again, the 
location variables complement the results of the off-farm work models.  Men are also more likely 
to participate in farm work in round one (wet season) as compared to round two (dry season).  
Unlike women, men do not show an increased participation in farm work during round three 
(November and December).  This seems to suggest the existence of gender division in farming 
tasks, with weeding and working in the dimba lands considered primarily women’s responsibilities 
(Green and Baden 1994).   
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Table 3  Women's participation in off-farm work and access to credit: two-step random-effects probit estimates 
corrected for endogeneity
Independent variables




Age   0.021
*  1.833  0.025
**  1.959
Able to at least read and write Chichewa   0.223  0.960  0.279  1.066
Log (total value of household assets)  0.205
*  1.706  0.132  1.058
Wife has access to formal credit   0.633
***  3.223 -- --
Husband has access to formal credit   0.052  0.247 -- --
Wife has access to informal credit  -- --  0.327
*  1.702
Husband has access to informal credit  -- --  0.148  0.816
Number of children between 
  0 and 5 years of age  -0.086 -0.722 -0.111 -0.843
  5 and 10 years of age   0.093  0.716  0.150  1.031
  10 and 17 years of age   0.087  0.801  0.118  0.982
Total adult population in household  0.041  0.391  0.033  0.294
Location (district) dummy variables
a









Round 2  0.395
**  1.987  0.229  1.294
Round 3  0.071  0.355 -0.062 -0.364
Rho  0.496
***  5.829  0.574
***  7.581
Likelihood ratio statistic (χ
2, 1)  39.594  60.993
P value  0.000  0.000
Log likelihood function -326.009 -334.026
Restricted log likelihood function -371.042 -371.042
χ
2, 16  90.066  74.031
P value  0.000  0.000
Number of observations: 698 (244 individuals)
a: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Women in male-headed households
Participate in off-farm work
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Table 4  Female head's participation in off-farm self-employed work, and access to





Able to at least read and write Chichewa (dummy variable) -0.653 -1.365
Log (total value of household assets)  0.293
*  1.724
Has access to credit   0.360  0.907
Number of children between 
  0 and 5 years of age  -0.024 -0.144
  5 and 10 years of age   0.131  0.769
  10 and 17 years of age   0.241  1.413
Total adult population in household -0.054 -0.358









Round 2  0.156  0.577
Round 3  0.198  0.530
Rho  0.285
*  1.676
Likelihood ratio statistic (χ
2, 1)  5.548
P value  0.019
Log likelihood function -123.640
Restricted log likelihood function -151.761
χ
2, 15  56.243
P value  0.000
Number of observations: 255 (87 individuals) 
a: Mangochi is omitted district. 
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Female-headed households
Participate in off-farm work
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Table 5  Men's participation in off-farm work and access to credit: two-step random-effects probit estimates 
corrected for endogeneity
Independent variables
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic





Able to at least read and write Chichewa  0.422
**  2.121  0.454
**  2.290
Log (total value of household assets)  0.163
*  1.732  0.204
**  2.324
Wife has access to formal credit  -0.140 -0.735 -- --
Husband has access to formal credit   0.275  1.375 -- --
Wife has access to informal credit  -- --  0.116  0.818
Husband has access to informal credit  -- --  0.299
*  1.751
Number of children between 
  0 and 5 years of age  -0.061 -0.696 -0.054 -0.655
  5 and 10 years of age   0.059  0.699  0.035  0.429
  10 and 17 years of age   0.163
**  2.475  0.158
**  2.326
Total adult population in household -0.237
*** -2.600 -0.236
*** -2.780
Location (district) dummy variables
a








Round 2  0.643
***  3.770  0.611
***  3.968
Round 3 0.649
***  3.646  0.705
***  3.965
Rho  0.180  1.610  0.171  1.516
Likelihood ratio statistic (χ
2, 1)  4.817  4.451
P value  0.028  0.035
Log likelihood function -297.879 -298.046
Restricted log likelihood function -346.473 -346.473
χ
2, 16  97.186  96.853
P value  0.000  0.000
Number of observations: 698 (244 individuals)
a: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Men
Participate in off-farm work  22 
Table 6  Women's participation in own-farm work and access to credit: probit estimates 
corrected for endogeneity
Independent variables
Marginal t-statistic Marginal t-statistic
effect effect
Constant  0.062  0.333  0.069  0.359
Age   0.001  0.646  0.001  0.360
Able to at least read and write Chichewa  -0.013 -0.367 -0.019 -0.551
Log (total value of household assets)  0.003  0.169 -0.003 -0.187
Wife has access to formal credit  -0.319
*** -6.417 -- --
Husband has access to formal credit   0.056  1.368 -- --
Wife has access to informal credit  -- -- -0.490
*** -6.770
Husband has access to informal credit  -- -- -0.040 -1.155
Number of children between 
  0 and 5 years of age   0.003  0.165 -0.002 -0.102
  5 and 10 years of age   0.010  0.511  0.007  0.372
  10 and 17 years of age  -0.001 -0.085 -0.003 -0.218
Total adult population in household  0.031
*  1.734  0.019  1.087
Location (district) dummy variables
a
Dowa -0.017 -0.255  0.266
***  4.000
Rumphi  0.079  1.238  0.230
***  3.624
Nkhotakota  0.142
**  2.065  0.162
***  2.162
Dedza  0.207





Round 3  0.199
***  3.148  0.166
***  2.719
Log likelihood function -748.241 -857.503
Restricted log likelihood function -889.021 -956.331
χ
2, 20  281.56  197.656
P value  0.000  0.000
Number of observations: 693
a: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Women in male-headed households
Participate in own-farm work
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Table 7  Female head's participation in farm work and access to credit: probit 
estimates corrected for endogeneity




Age   0.001  0.308
Able to at least read and write Chichewa (dummy variable) -0.012 -0.130
Log (total value of household assets)  0.019  0.411
Has access to credit  -0.147 -0.365
Number of children between 
  0 and 5 years of age   0.014  0.317
  5 and 10 years of age   0.020  0.444
  10 and 17 years of age   0.044  1.059
Total adult population in household  0.033  0.736
Location (district) dummy variables
a
Dowa  0.142  0.975
Rumphi  0.052  0.524





Round 3  0.244
**  2.557
Log likelihood function -311.369
Restricted log likelihood function -343.545
χ
2, 18  64.352
P value  0.000
Number of observations: 254
a: Mangochi is omitted district. 
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Female-headed households
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Table 8  Men's participation in own-farm work and access to credit: two-step random-effects probit estimates 
corrected for endogeneity
Independent variables
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant  0.558  0.762  0.644  0.913
Age   0.016
**  2.317  0.014
**  2.105
Able to at least read and write Chichewa  -0.395
* -1.938 -0.398
** -1.983
Log (total value of household assets) -0.113 -1.355 -0.123 -1.560
Wife has access to formal credit  -0.379
** -2.063 -- --
Husband has access to formal credit  -0.262 -1.511 -- --
Wife has access to informal credit  -- -- -0.139 -0.952
Husband has access to informal credit  -- -- -0.047 -0.302
Number of children between 
  0 and 5 years of age   0.034  0.414  0.045  0.560
  5 and 10 years of age   0.065  0.707  0.031  0.354
  10 and 17 years of age  -0.100 -1.381 -0.107 -1.517
Total adult population in household  0.027  0.314  0.013  0.159
Location (district) dummy variables
a
Dowa  0.623
**  2.094  0.684
**  2.469
Rumphi  1.220
***  5.076  1.203
***  5.156
Nkhotakota  0.696
***  3.169  0.740
***  3.537
Dedza  1.325





Round 3  0.056  0.329  0.180  1.076
Rho  0.286
***  3.521  0.264
***  3.183
Likelihood ratio statistic (χ
2, 1)  16.447  14.237
P value  0.000  0.000
Log likelihood function -384.577 -388.730
Restricted log likelihood function -455.329 -455.329
χ
2, 16  141.504  133.197
P value  0.000  0.000
Number of observations: 698 (244 individuals)
a: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Men
Participate in own-farm work
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Credit and Consumption Expenditures 
The expenditure module was administered in all three rounds of the IFPRI survey and is broadly 
categorized as food and non-food expenditures.  The food expenditure module provides information on 
quantities and source of food consumed, prices of food and money paid for food purchase, imputed value 
of food out of domestic production, and value of in-kind salary received as food.  The non-food 
expenditure categories include clothing, personal care products, energy, health and education and 
infrequent expenditures like religious events and social ceremonies.  The recall period for food 
expenditures is three days and for non-food expenditures, depending upon the type of product, the recall 
period varies from one to three months.  In the empirical work, the expenditure shares are standardized to 
one month.  After some experimentation, the expenditures were classified into eight categories:  food, 
energy, health (medicines and doctors’ fees), education, adult goods (expenditures on men’s clothing and 
accessories, expenditures on women’s clothing and accessories, and expenditures on cigarettes and 
alcohol), children’s clothing and accessories, nondurables (mainly essential consumption items and 
household utensils) and social activities (social ceremonies, religious events and recreation).  The 
expenditure models estimated utilize the data from all three rounds.  The main advantage of this approach 
is that seasonal effects (likely to be important for food expenditure in an agrarian setting) can be 
controlled for.   
Table 9 presents the summary statistics of the expenditure shares for male-headed and female-
headed households that form the sample for the credit–expenditure models.  It is seen that expenditure on 
food dominates the total expenditure of the households in the sample, with approximately 41 percent of 
the cash value of food consumed produced in their own fields.  This is slightly lower than the figure 
reported by the National Economic Council (2000), which estimates subsistence production at more than 
50 percent of the value of food consumed by rural households.  Female-headed households spend 
significantly higher amounts on food as compared to male-headed households (90 percent versus 85 
percent).  This likely reflects the higher poverty status of the female-headed households.  Investments in 
education, at 0.2 percent for male-headed households and 0.1 percent for female-headed households, are 
at the lower end of monthly expenditures.  On average, expenditures on health, education and children 
together account for less than 2 percent of the monthly expenditures.  It is also in these categories that a 
majority of households reports zero expenditure.     26 




a Mean Median %
a
Food 0.85 0.87 (0) 0.90
* 0.92 (0)
 Produced at home 0.35 0.33 (22) 0.37 0.28 (28)
 Purchased 0.50 0.54 (2) 0.53 0.62 (9)
Energy 0.05 0.03 (5) 0.03
* 0.02 (16)
Health 0.003 0 (67) 0.002
* 0 (80)
Education 0.002 0 (87) 0.001 0 (76)
Adult goods 0.03 0.01 (35) 0.01
* 0 (47)
Children's clothing and accessories 0.01 0 (71) 0.01 0 (72)
Nondurables 0.04 0.03 (8) 0.04 0.03 (4)
Social activities 0.001 0 (92) 0.002
* 0 (83)
Total monthly expenditure (MK) 449 445
Number of observations  753 275
 Source: Based on own calculations from DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a: Percent of households with zero expenditure are given in parentheses.
Shares do not add up to one because expenditure on miscelleanous items is not included.
*:  Tested for difference in means.  Significant at 10% or higher.




Expenditure Shares and Access to Formal Credit:  The results for the formal credit model for 
male-headed households (Table 10) indicate that the household should not be treated as a single entity and 
that men’s and women’s access to credit have different effects on household expenditure patterns.  Men’s 
access to formal credit has a positive impact on food shares and a negative impact on the share of adult 
goods.  Given that formal credit to men is mainly in-kind agricultural credit, it is to be expected that 
men’s access will have a positive impact on food production and, hence, on the budget share of food since 
it includes the value of food consumed from home production.   
Women’s access to formal credit has a positive and significant effect on the share of health 
expenditures (Table 10).  Expenditures on health can be interpreted as increasing the overall welfare of 
the household, and this finding is consistent with results from previous studies (Doss 1996, Thomas and 
Chen 1993).     27 
In the education budget share equation for male-headed households (Table 10) the demographic 
composition variables suggest that controlling for household size, an increase in the number of infants and 
children under 10 relative to the reference category (men between the ages 15 to 65) reduces the 
expenditures on education.  A study by Nankhuni and Findeis (2002) finds that individuals in Malawi are 
attending school into their early twenties.  Thus, it is likely that expenditure on schooling is greater for 
secondary and higher level of schooling than it is for primary school.  In order to check if the same result 
was valid in this sample, the household composition variables were re-categorized with no significantly 
different results.  In the adult goods budget share equation, the household composition variables suggest 
that the presence of older males (greater than 65 years of age) increases expenditure share on adult goods 
while the presence of older women decreases the expenditure share. 
Table 10.1 shows the effect of access to formal credit when expenditures on food are 
disaggregated into value of food purchased and value of food produced within the household.  Consistent 
with expectations, men’s access to formal credit increases home production, while reducing the share of 
food purchased by the household.  The location variables (district dummies) in Table 10.1 indicate that 
households in the Mangochi district (reference category) are more likely to purchase food and less likely 
to produce food at home than households in the other districts.  As discussed previously in the labor 
allocation models, Mangochi in Southern Malawi has a higher population density and limited agricultural 
land available as compared to the other districts in Malawi.  Thus, it is likely that the location variables 
reflect the higher food production within the household in the other four districts in the Northern and 
Central regions of the country.  The round dummy variables in the food equations show that households 
are less likely to purchase food in round one (or more likely to consume food out of their own production) 
as compared to round two and round three.  As discussed previously, certain crops are ready for 
harvesting in the months of February to April (round 1), which is likely to boost household food stocks in 
that period.  Consistent with the small farm size and subsistence nature of production in the sample, an 
increase in agricultural area (in acres) owned by the household reduces the share of food purchased by the 
household, implying that households are focused on production of subsistence crops, not cash crops.   
For female heads, rather surprisingly, access to formal credit reduces the budget share on food 
(Table 11).  Since female-headed households are on average poorer than male-headed households, it is 
implausible to consider the reduction in food expenditures as a sign of prosperity.  Access to formal credit 
increases the budget share allocated to adult goods.  Similar results were reported by Handa (1996) in a 
study of female-headed households in Jamaica.  The study concluded that it was likely that women too 
had their ‘vices’, viz., expenditures on clothing and accessories.  Similar to the results for women in male-
headed households, female head’s access to formal credit has a positive and significant effect on the share 
of health expenditures.   28 
The effect of access to formal credit on the value of food purchased and value of food produced 
within the household is examined in Table11.1.  The district dummies and the round dummies show 
results that are similar to the models for male-headed households and are not discussed again (see Table 
10.1).   
Expenditure Shares and Access to Informal Credit:  In male-headed households, informal credit 
seems to be playing a more supplementary role, with men’s and women’s access increasing the share of 
total household expenditure allocated to health and education, respectively, and women’s access reducing 
the share allocated to social activities (Table 12).  It is seen that the household expenditure and 
composition, and location variables in the formal and informal access models show similar results to the 
access to formal credit models in terms of direction and significance of their effects.  Not surprisingly, the 
disaggregated food expenditure equations (Table 12.1) do not show any effect of either men’s access to 
informal credit or women’s access to informal credit on the value of food purchased or produced at home.  
Once again, the district dummies suggest that relative to households in other districts, households in the 
Mangochi district are more likely to spend money purchasing food.   
Access to informal credit increases the household allocation to the food budget for female-headed 
households, suggesting that informal credit is helping to maintain food security in the household (Table 
13).  If indeed informal credit is mainly used for consumption-smoothing purposes at times of dire need, 
then it provides an insight as to why access to informal credit reduces outlays towards those items that are 
not crucial like education and children’s clothing.  The location and the district dummies in the 
disaggregated food expenditure equations (Table 13.1) show similar results to the other models discussed 











 Table 10  Household expenditure shares and access to formal credit in male-headed households: 2SLS and Tobit estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.937
***  5.213 -0.030 -0.421 -0.135
*** -2.927 -0.032 -0.926
Ln total monthly expenditure -0.026 -0.769  0.010  0.907  0.020
***  2.748 -0.002 -0.415
Ln total household size  0.033  1.354  0.008  1.228  0.002  0.606  0.032
***  3.373
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.001 -0.545  0.001  1.024  0.0001  0.126  0.001  1.116
Wife has access to formal credit   0.005  0.466 -0.006 -1.080  0.005
*  1.730  0.006  0.870
Husband has access to formal credit   0.019
*  1.741  0.007  1.419  0.002  0.587 -0.005 -0.687
Demographic composition
d
  Males, 0-5 -0.029 -0.616  0.019  0.949  0.011  0.872 -0.081
** -2.527
  Females, 0-5 -0.047 -0.982  0.019  0.895  0.016  1.169 -0.118
*** -3.240
  Males, 5-10  0.033  0.646 -0.010 -0.394  0.012  1.063 -0.087
** -2.519
  Females, 5-10  0.006  0.111  0.007  0.310  0.006  0.417 -0.082
** -2.310
  Males, 10-15  0.034  0.700 -0.009 -0.361  0.019  0.871 -0.024 -0.786
  Females, 10-15  0.016  0.296  0.008  0.426 -0.004 -0.297  0.018  0.532
  Females, 15-65  0.022  0.397  0.029  1.350  0.009  0.554 -0.051 -1.426
  Males, 65+  0.022  0.308 -0.089
*** -2.883 -0.025 -1.264 -0.135
* -1.930
  Females, 65+  0.146  1.382  0.105
**  2.238  0.078
***  3.044 -0.077 -0.776
Location (district) dummy variables
e
  Dowa  0.017  0.765 -0.021
** -2.176  0.006  1.064 -0.008 -0.726
  Rumphi  0.033
**  1.975 -0.021
*** -2.633 -0.003 -0.629 -0.001 -0.097
  Nkhotakota  0.021  1.618 -0.029
*** -3.384 -0.011
** -2.557  0.003  0.338
  Dedza  0.016  0.846 -0.016
** -2.496 -0.0001 -0.022 -0.015
* -1.645
Round variables
Round 2 -0.003 -0.348 -0.003 -0.550 -0.011
*** -3.420 -0.045
*** -5.615




2 -0.031 -2.636 -0.0260  -3.522   
σ  0.050  16.661
Overidentification test statistic  7.021
Likelihood ratio statistic   123.455
P value  0.219  0.000
Number of observations:  753 (Continued on next page)
 a: 2SLS estimates;  b: Simultaneous-Tobit estimates;  c: Tobit estimates;  d: Males 15-65 is reference category;  e: Mangochi is omitted district.






 29Table 10  Household expenditure shares and access to formal credit in male-headed households: 2SLS and Tobit estimates (continued)
Independent variables
Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.090
***  2.689 -0.134
*** -3.148  0.029  0.604 -0.044
** -2.203
Ln total monthly expenditure -0.004 -0.834  0.010
*  1.831  0.0003  0.041  0.002  0.931
Ln total household size -0.028
*** -3.068  0.023
**  2.046  0.002  0.418  0.006
*  1.173
Household agricultural area (acres)  0.001
*  1.814 -0.002 -1.607  0.001
*  1.708  0.0001  0.225
Wife has access to formal credit  -0.004 -0.668 -0.004 -0.533 -0.0002 -0.059  0.004  0.973
Husband has access to formal credit  -0.017
** -2.540 -0.009 -1.070  0.003  0.744 -0.007 -1.542
Demographic composition
d
  Males, 0-5   0.003   0.094   0.072
*   1.915   0.014   0.831  -0.016  -0.885
  Females, 0-5  0.066
**  2.147  0.115
***  2.950  0.002  0.150 -0.005 -0.294
  Males, 5-10  0.001  0.026 -0.045 -1.104 -0.010 -0.537  0.005  0.251
  Females, 5-10  0.035  1.066 -0.007 -0.180  0.026  1.509 -0.028 -1.394
  Males, 10-15 -0.002 -0.075  0.026  0.631 -0.001 -0.044  0.001  0.040
  Females, 10-15 -0.020 -0.571  0.022  0.510 -0.004 -0.235 -0.028 -1.320
  Females, 15-65 -0.030 -0.800 -0.011 -0.239  0.008  0.430 -0.006 -0.300
  Males, 65+  0.079
*  1.815 -0.030 -0.449  0.032
** -2.137  0.026  1.095
  Females, 65+ -0.185
*** -2.603 -0.066 -0.540 -0.053 -1.443 -0.005 -0.131
Location (district) dummy variables
e
  Dowa  0.008  0.893  0.016  1.353 -0.005 -0.733  0.014
**  2.538





  Nkhotakota -0.012 -1.488  0.025
***  2.642 -0.012
** -2.180 -0.010
* -1.871
  Dedza -0.012 -1.488 -0.001 -0.102 -0.006 -1.383  0.001  0.164
Round variables




*** -4.550  0.006




σ  0.066  29.284  0.066  18.725  0.024  10.589
Likelihood ratio statistic   86.487  107.039  56.433
P value  0.000  0.000  0.000
Number of observations:  753
 a: 2SLS estimates;  b: Simultaneous-Tobit estimates;  c: Tobit estimates;  d: Males 15-65 is reference category;  e: Mangochi is omitted district.






 30Table 10.1  Household expenditure shares on food (produced at home and purchased) and access 
to formal credit in male-headed households: 2SLS estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant -1.155
*** -2.588  2.092
***  4.305
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.325
***  3.940 -0.351
*** -3.902
Ln total household size -0.134
** -2.242  0.166
**  2.560
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.019
*** -2.989  0.010
**  2.543
Wife has access to formal credit  -0.032 -1.270  0.036  1.339
Husband has access to formal credit  -0.050




  Males, 0-5  0.092  0.774 -0.121 -0.938
  Females, 0-5 -0.028 -0.237 -0.019 -0.146
  Males, 5-10  0.059  0.459 -0.026 -0.182
  Females, 5-10 -0.156 -1.255  0.162  1.194
  Males, 10-15  0.086  0.719 -0.052 -0.401
  Females, 10-15 -0.033 -0.251  0.049  0.340
  Females, 15-65  0.181  1.310 -0.159 -1.056
  Males, 65+  0.396
**  2.251 -0.374
* -1.953
  Females, 65+  0.425  1.621 -0.279 -0.977
Location (district) dummy variables
b
  Dowa -0.197
*** -3.577  0.214
***  3.567
  Rumphi -0.095
** -2.315  0.127
***  2.857
  Nkhotakota -0.233
*** -7.331  0.254
***  7.330
  Dedza -0.184
*** -3.906  0.200
***  3.900
Round 2  0.078
***  3.160 -0.082
*** -3.030
Round 3  0.063
**  2.336 -0.050
* -1.693
Overidentification test  8.934  7.782
P value   0.111  0.169
Number of observations:  753
 a: Males 15-65 is reference category;  b:
 Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Home production Purchased
31Table 11  Household expenditure shares and access to formal credit in female-headed households: OLS and Tobit estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.716
***  10.540  0.077
**  2.055 -0.036
* -1.810 -0.028 -0.962
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.038
***  3.736 -0.011
* -1.863 -0.0001 -0.025  0.001  0.263
Ln total household size -0.012 -0.697  0.014  1.578  0.006  1.480  0.018
**  2.513
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.004
* -1.685  0.001  0.972 -0.0002 -0.363  0.0003  0.398
Has access to formal credit  -0.026
* -1.861  0.012  1.594  0.009
**  2.503 -0.001 -0.169
Demographic composition
b
  Males, 0-5 -0.175
*** -2.934  0.060
*  1.860  0.014  0.852 -0.035 -1.191
  Females, 0-5 -0.027 -0.490 -0.024 -0.784  0.019  1.182  0.008  0.370
  Males, 5-10 -0.038 -0.640 -0.025 -0.765  0.016  0.911  0.002  0.099
  Females, 5-10 -0.073 -1.338  0.011  0.361 0.000 -0.001 -0.044
* -1.746
  Males, 10-15  0.028  0.517 -0.031 -1.037  0.019  1.312 -0.033 -1.359
  Females, 10-15  0.043  0.735 -0.027 -0.855  0.011  0.661 -0.008 -0.339
  Females, 15-65 -0.054 -1.255  0.019  0.805  0.025
**  2.036 -0.002 -0.111
  Males, 65+ -0.024 -0.077 -0.124 -0.742 -0.768 -0.043  0.025  0.189
  Females, 65+ -0.015 -0.261 -0.009 -0.286  0.033
**  1.983 -0.006 -0.207
Location (district) dummy variables
c
  Dowa  0.044
*  1.752 -0.037
*** -2.670 -0.005 -0.704 -0.023
* -1.836
  Rumphi  0.042
**  2.491 -0.012 -1.335 -0.003 -0.654 -0.019
*** -2.589
  Nkhotakota  0.032  1.559 -0.023
** -2.085 -0.0004 -0.075 -0.022
** -2.496
  Dedza  0.031
*  1.770 -0.015 -1.531  0.007  1.393 -0.019
** -2.297
Round variables
  Round 2 -0.010 -0.723  0.005  0.620 -0.010
*** -2.739 -0.013
** -2.111
  Round 3  0.001  0.072  0.0004  0.044 -0.016
*** -3.389 -0.014
** -2.015
σ  0.050  21.979  0.018  10.564  0.026  9.566
F statistic  2.280
Likelihood ratio statistic  32.020  47.505  44.187
P value  0.002  0.031  0.000  0.001
Number of observations:  275 (Continued on next page)
 a: OLS estimates;  b: Males, 15-65 is reference category;  c: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Food
a Energy Health Education
 32Table 11  Household expenditure shares and access to formal credit in female-headed households: OLS and Tobit estimates (continued)
Independent variables
Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant -0.048
* -1.654 -0.147
** -2.068  0.170
***  5.088 -0.049 -1.142
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.006  1.337  0.016
*  1.651 -0.026
*** -5.207  0.004  0.721
Ln total household size -0.003 -0.471 -0.011 -0.708  0.003  0.336 -0.013 -1.409
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.0001 -0.059  0.0001  0.073  0.002
**  2.102  0.0001  0.112
Has access to formal credit   0.014
**  2.263  0.002  0.146  0.006  0.880  0.002  0.274
Demographic composition
b
  Males, 0-5  0.046
*  1.837  0.187
***  3.382  0.058
**  1.971 -0.088 -1.522
  Females, 0-5  0.028  1.212  0.045  0.834  0.010  0.382  0.068
**  2.174
  Males, 5-10 -0.007 -0.298  0.031  0.590  0.058
**  2.022 -0.009 -0.239
  Females, 5-10  0.032  1.418  0.103
**  1.995  0.028  1.049  0.052
*  1.755
  Males, 10-15 -0.011 -0.486  0.047  0.954  0.008  0.314  0.031  0.968
  Females, 10-15 -0.001 -0.027 -0.054 -0.850 -0.009 -0.308  0.021  0.647
  Females, 15-65  0.008  0.453  0.018  0.397  0.016  0.762  0.014  0.492
  Males, 65+  0.241
**  2.059 -0.014 -0.042  0.024  0.158 -0.956 -0.035
  Females, 65+  0.005  0.211 -0.046 -0.631  0.0001  0.003  0.019  0.526
Location (district) dummy variables
c
  Dowa  0.010  1.017 -0.003 -0.116 -0.003 -0.221 -0.009 -0.740
  Rumphi -0.007 -0.950 -0.013 -0.879 -0.021
** -2.509 -0.026
* -1.840
  Nkhotakota -0.023
** -2.347  0.020  1.143 -0.011 -1.092  0.020
**  2.088
  Dedza  0.009  1.305 -0.004 -0.259 -0.007 -0.850 -0.001 -0.092
Round variables
  Round 2  0.015
**  2.479 -0.011 -0.915  0.0004  0.064 -0.005 -0.664
  Round 3 -0.004 -0.609 -0.052
*** -3.232  0.010  1.226  0.035
*** -2.884
σ  0.035  16.381  0.057  9.247  0.045  22.588  0.027  7.328
Likelihood ratio statistic   40.396  48.728  54.235  50.306
P value  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000
Number of observations:  275
 a: OLS estimates;  b: Males, 15-65 is reference category;  c: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Adult goods Children Nondurables Social activities
 33Table 11.1  Household expenditure shares on food (produced at home and purchased) and access 
to formal credit in female-headed households: OLS estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.388
**  2.158  0.328
*  1.707
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.066
**  2.436 -0.028 -0.956
Ln total household size -0.071 -1.615  0.059  1.262
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.00004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.589
Has access to formal credit  -0.053 -1.415  0.027  0.664
Demographic composition
a
  Males, 0-5 -0.007 -0.042 -0.168 -0.997
  Females, 0-5  0.219  1.518  -0.245 -1.591
  Males, 5-10 -0.070 -0.449  0.032  0.193
  Females, 5-10  0.064  0.444 -0.138 -0.888
  Males, 10-15  0.071  0.493 -0.043 -0.278
  Females, 10-15  0.042  0.273  0.001  0.005
  Females, 15-65  0.033  0.294 -0.087 -0.718
  Males, 65+  0.972  1.198 -0.996 -1.146
  Females, 65+ -0.202 -1.298  0.187  1.120
Location (district) dummy variables
b
  Dowa -0.346
*** -5.240  0.390
***  5.514
  Rumphi -0.169
*** -3.781  0.210
***  4.412
  Nkhotakota -0.287
*** -5.261  0.319
***  5.464
  Dedza -0.337
*** -7.259  0.368
***  7.405
Round 2  0.054  1.439 -0.065 -1.599
Round 3  0.118
***  2.887 -0.117
*** -2.671
F statistic  7.950  6.960
P value  0.000  0.000
Number of observations:  275
 a: Males 15-65 is reference category;  b: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Purchased Home production
34Table 12  Household expenditure shares and access to informal credit in male-headed households: 2SLS and Tobit estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.920
***  4.956 -0.032 -0.450 -0.139
*** -3.008 -0.043 -1.262
Ln total monthly expenditure -0.023 -0.669  0.011  0.932 0.020
***  2.841 -0.001 -0.287
Ln total household size  0.033  1.330  0.007  1.116  0.003  0.870  0.033
***  3.557
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.001 -0.526  0.001  1.284  0.00004  0.084  0.0004  0.620
Wife has access to informal credit  -0.003 -0.367 -0.005 -1.041 -0.001 -0.366  0.015
**  2.518
Husband has access to informal credit   0.012  1.322 -0.002 -0.539 0.004
*  1.871  0.008  1.241
Demographic composition
d
  Males, 0-5 -0.027 -0.559  0.022  1.046  0.010  0.778 -0.080
** -2.521
  Females, 0-5 -0.044 -0.942  0.022  0.981  0.015  1.118 -0.119
*** -3.274
  Males, 5-10  0.043  0.836 -0.004 -0.140  0.012  1.054 -0.093
*** -2.721
  Females, 5-10  0.008  0.168  0.011  0.508  0.006  0.465 -0.090
** -2.571
  Males, 10-15  0.040  0.832 -0.007 -0.287  0.011  0.941 -0.025 -0.813
  Females, 10-15  0.016  0.312  0.009  0.467 -0.005 -0.329  0.017  0.496
  Females, 15-65  0.028  0.502  0.030  1.436  0.009  0.558 -0.049 -1.377
  Males, 65+  0.038  0.551 -0.081
*** -2.620 -0.026 -1.337 -0.117
* -1.753
  Females, 65+  0.156  1.479  0.093
**  2.046  0.084
***  3.201 -0.063 -0.643
Location (district) dummy variables
e
  Dowa  0.020  0.902 -0.014 -1.389  0.004  0.719 -0.019
* -1.831
  Rumphi  0.034
**  2.022 -0.017
** -2.091 -0.004 -0.786 -0.007 -0.814
  Nkhotakota  0.020  1.532 -0.026
*** -3.278 -0.013
*** -2.805 -0.001 -0.164
  Dedza  0.019  1.021 -0.011
* -1.820 -0.002 -0.404 -0.022
** -2.447
Round variables
  Round 2 -0.009 -0.908 -0.003 -0.645 -0.012
*** -4.200 -0.043
*** -5.741




2 -0.031 -2.594 -0.027 -3.668
σ  0.050  16.721
Overidentification test statistic  5.628
Likelihood ratio statistic   132.807
P value  0.229  0.000
Number of observations:  753 (Continued on next page)
 a: 2SLS estimates;  b: Simultaneous-Tobit estimates;  c: Tobit estimates;  d: Males 15-65 is reference category;  e: Mangochi is omitted district.






 35Table 12  Household expenditure shares and access to informal credit in male-headed households: 2SLS and Tobit estimates (continued)
Independent variables
Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.095
***  2.853 -0.133
*** -3.131  0.027  0.537 -0.038
** -1.993
Ln total monthly expenditure -0.005 -1.096  0.010
*  1.795  0.001  0.080  0.002  0.774
Ln total household size -0.030
*** -3.187  0.022
*  1.956  0.002  0.456  0.006  1.141
Household agricultural area (acres)  0.001  1.427 -0.002 -1.640  0.001
*  1.732  0.00001  0.027
Wife has access to formal credit   0.001  0.240  0.001  0.099  0.0005  0.148 -0.009
*** -2.583
Husband has access to formal credit   0.003  0.530 -0.005 -0.657  0.001  0.173  0.002  0.593
Demographic composition
d
  Males, 0-5  0.001  0.047  0.072
*  1.919  0.015  0.870 -0.015 -0.843
  Females, 0-5  0.067
**  2.163  0.115
***  2.950  0.003  0.162 -0.005 -0.249
  Males, 5-10 -0.011 -0.322 -0.049 -1.193 -0.009 -0.465  0.007  0.344
  Females, 5-10  0.027  0.819 -0.008 -0.208  0.026  1.543 -0.021 -1.046
  Males, 10-15 -0.008 -0.258  0.024  0.584 -0.0002 -0.012  0.003  0.189
  Females, 10-15 -0.020 -0.565  0.022  0.496 -0.004 -0.252 -0.023 -1.137
  Females, 15-65 -0.032 -0.844 -0.012 -0.252  0.009  0.457 -0.001 -0.067
  Males, 65+  0.065  1.491 -0.039 -0.584 -0.030
* -1.990  0.020  0.886
  Females, 65+ -0.177
**  -2.470 -0.071 -0.573 -0.054 -1.420  0.002  0.060
Location (district) dummy variables
e
  Dowa  0.002  0.174  0.015  1.358 -0.004 -0.602 -0.012
** 2.448
  Rumphi -0.031
*** -3.327 -0.031
*** -2.605 -0.009 -1.619 -0.013
** -2.178
  Nkhotakota -0.014
* -1.656  0.025
***  2.723 -0.012
** -2.209 -0.009
* -1.657
  Dedza -0.017
** -2.192 -0.001 -0.128 -0.005 -1.206 -0.001 -0.260
Round variables
  Round 2  0.010  1.609 -0.007 -0.994  0.002  0.469 -0.009
** -2.490
  Round 3 -0.015
** -2.108 -0.042
*** -4.479  0.006




σ  0.066  29.283  0.067  18.718  0.024  10.616
Likelihood ratio statistic   80.175  106.125  59.885
P value  0.000  0.000  0.000
Number of observations:  753
 a: 2SLS estimates;  b: Simultaneous-Tobit estimates;  c: Tobit estimates;  d: Males 15-65 is reference category;  e: Mangochi is omitted district.






 36Table 12.1  Household expenditure shares on food (produced at home and purchased) and access 
to informal credit in male-headed households: 2SLS estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant -0.976
** -2.179  1.897
***  3.915
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.291
***  3.488 -0.314
*** -3.482
Ln total household size -0.121
** -2.010  0.154
**  2.369
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.010
*** -2.895  0.010
**  2.475
Wife has access to informal credit   0.004  0.201 -0.007 -0.326
Husband has access to informal credit  -0.012 -0.538  0.024  1.004
Demographic composition
a
  Males, 0-5  0.079  0.689 -0.106 -0.852
  Females, 0-5 -0.029 -0.253 -0.016 -0.127
  Males, 5-10  0.024  0.198  0.018  0.137
  Females, 5-10 -0.174 -1.436  0.182  1.393
  Males, 10-15  0.063  0.545 -0.023 -0.185
  Females, 10-15 -0.043 -0.338  0.060  0.432
  Females, 15-65  0.168  1.259 -0.140 -0.972
  Males, 65+  0.341
**  2.045 -0.303
* -1.680
  Females, 65+  0.403  1.583 -0.247 -0.898
Location (district) dummy variables
b
  Dowa -0.217
*** -4.077  0.237
***  4.116
  Rumphi -0.110
*** -2.730  0.144
***  3.300
  Nkhotakota -0.227
*** -7.296  0.247
***  7.335
  Dedza -0.200
*** -4.464  0.218
***  4.520
Round 2  0.096
***  4.160 -0.104
*** -4.194
Round 3  0.082
***  3.253 -0.072
*** -2.638
Overidentification test  9.807  7.514
P value   0.081  0.111
Number of observations:  753
 a: Males 15-65 is reference category;  b: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Purchased Home production
37Table 13  Household expenditure shares and access to informal credit in female-headed households: OLS and Tobit estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.726
***  10.766  0.072
*  1.920 -0.045
** -2.238 -0.022 -0.794
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.033
***  3.320 -0.008 -1.482  0.002  0.550  0.002  0.382
Ln total household size -0.011 -0.637  0.014  1.512  0.009
*  1.924  0.016
**  2.303
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.004
* -1.676  0.001  0.953 0.000 -0.635  0.001  0.606
Has access to informal credit   0.021




  Males, 0-5 -0.183
*** -3.063  0.064
**  1.960  0.012  0.691 -0.031 -1.078
  Females, 0-5 -0.035 -0.633 -0.021 -0.674  0.016  1.039  0.009  0.383
  Males, 5-10 -0.054 -0.918 -0.017 -0.510  0.015  0.856  0.002  0.101
  Females, 5-10 -0.071 -1.284  0.010  0.312 -0.001 -0.048 -0.044
* -1.792
  Males, 10-15  0.002  0.046 -0.020 -0.662  0.020  1.354 -0.028 -1.178
  Females, 10-15  0.024  0.405 -0.019 -0.580  0.012  0.745 -0.007 -0.289
  Females, 15-65 -0.064 -1.501  0.024  1.007  0.028
**  2.229 -0.004 -0.245
  Males, 65+ -0.109 -0.353 -0.088 -0.520 -0.773 -0.043  0.060  0.476
  Females, 65+ -0.022 -0.377 -0.006 -0.194  0.032
*  1.913 -0.004 -0.164
Location (district) dummy variables
c
  Dowa  0.038  1.501 -0.035
** -2.486 -0.006 -0.791 -0.019 -1.577
  Rumphi  0.035
**  2.073 -0.009 -1.012 -0.004 -0.929 -0.017
** -2.316
  Nkhotakota  0.038
*  1.824 -0.026
** -2.308 -0.002 -0.388 -0.023
*** -2.649
  Dedza  0.033
*  1.861 -0.016 -1.615 0.005 1.052 -0.018
** -2.222
Round variables
  Round 2  0.002  0.158 -0.001 -0.091 -0.012
*** -3.094 -0.016
*** -2.632
  Round 3  0.020  1.252 -0.008 -0.912 -0.018
*** -3.765 -0.018
*** -2.633
σ  0.050  21.981  0.018  10.534  0.025  9.586
F statistic  2.240
Likelihood ratio statistic   30.940  42.101  47.926
P value  0.003  0.041  0.002  0.000
Number of observations:  275 (Continued on next page)
 a: OLS estimates;  b: Males, 15-65 is reference category;  c: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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 38Table 13  Household expenditure shares and access to informal credit in female-headed households: OLS and Tobit estimates (continued)
Independent variables
Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient  t statistic Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant -0.057
* -1.954 -0.138
** -1.995  0.168
***  5.053 -0.058 -1.312
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.008
*  1.864  0.017
*  1.837 -0.025
*** -5.079  0.005  0.836
Ln total household size -0.002 -0.340 -0.015 -0.990  0.003  0.312 -0.011 -1.236
Household agricultural area (acres) -0.0002 -0.214  0.0004  0.244  0.002
**  2.094  0.00004  0.047
Has access to informal credit  -0.002 -0.377 -0.030
** -2.463 -0.005 -0.741  0.004  0.587
Demographic composition
b
  Males, 0-5  0.048
*  1.886  0.204
***  3.610  0.060
**  2.028 -0.089 -1.513
  Females, 0-5  0.030  1.254  0.050  0.920  0.012  0.442  0.071
**  2.223
  Males, 5-10 -0.003 -0.137  0.039  0.743  0.062
**  2.148 -0.005 -0.145
  Females, 5-10  0.031  1.360  0.111
**  2.132  0.028  1.022  0.054
*  1.783
  Males, 10-15 -0.004 -0.167  0.072  1.415  0.014  0.531  0.032  0.994
  Females, 10-15  0.009  0.339 -0.039 -0.616 -0.004 -0.149  0.024  0.739
  Females, 15-65  0.013  0.718  0.023  0.499  0.018  0.874  0.018  0.613
  Males, 65+  0.258
**  2.167  0.125  0.380  0.043  0.283 -0.966 -0.036
  Females, 65+  0.007  0.286 -0.044 -0.612  0.002  0.054  0.024  0.658
Location (district) dummy variables
c
  Dowa  0.011  1.102  0.005  0.213 -0.001 -0.109 -0.011 -0.850
  Rumphi -0.005 -0.643 -0.004 -0.287 -0.019
** -2.303 -0.026
* -1.873
  Nkhotakota -0.025
*** -2.590  0.018  1.019 -0.012 -1.213  0.020
**  2.083
  Dedza  0.008  1.142 -0.003 -0.215 -0.008 -0.893 -0.001 -0.084
Round variables
  Round 2  0.010
*  1.742 -0.019 -1.586 -0.002 -0.350 -0.004 -0.573
  Round 3 -0.010 -1.477 -0.067
*** -4.014  0.005  0.664 -0.035
*** -2.821
σ  0.035  16.351  0.056  9.273  0.045  22.591  0.027  7.321
Likelihood ratio statistic   35.406  55.279  54.010  50.580
P value  0.012  0.000  0.000  0.000
Number of observations:  275
 a: OLS estimates;  b: Males, 15-65 is reference category;  c: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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 39Table 13.1  Household expenditure shares on food (produced at home and purchased) and access 
to informal credit in female-headed households: OLS estimates
Independent variables
Coefficient t  statistic Coefficient t  statistic
Constant  0.435
**  2.436  0.291  1.526
Ln total monthly expenditure  0.059
**  2.212 -0.026 -0.900
Ln total household size -0.079
* -1.801  0.069  1.465
Household agricultural area (acres)  0.001  0.134 -0.004 -0.719
Has access to informal credit  -0.015 -0.464  0.036  1.022
Demographic composition
a
  Males, 0-5 -0.001 -0.003 -0.183 -1.081
  Females, 0-5  0.215  1.484 -0.249 -1.617
  Males, 5-10 -0.083 -0.536  0.029  0.178
  Females, 5-10  0.064  0.436 -0.134 -0.864
  Males, 10-15  0.054  0.373 -0.051 -0.334
  Females, 10-15  0.015  0.097  0.009  0.052
  Females, 15-65  0.010  0.090 -0.074 -0.616
  Males, 65+  0.987  1.202 -1.096 -1.253
  Females, 65+ -0.215 -1.377  0.193  1.159
Location (district) dummy variables
b
  Dowa -0.344
*** -5.150  0.382
***  5.365
  Rumphi -0.170
*** -3.779  0.206
***  4.281
  Nkhotakota -0.281
*** -5.155  0.319
***  5.483
  Dedza -0.333
*** -7.157  0.366
***  7.376
Round 2  0.064
*  1.686 -0.062 -1.526
Round 3  0.129
***  3.124 -0.110
*** -2.489
F statistic  7.800  7.010
P value  0.000  0.000
Number of observations:  275
 a: Males 15-65 is reference category;  b: Mangochi is omitted district.
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Purchased Home production
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Discussion 
The credit–labor allocation models indicate that access to formal as well as informal credit 
increases participation in off-farm self-employment activities, and reduces participation in own farm 
work for women in male-headed households.  Access to informal credit increases men’s participation in 
off-farm self-employment activities.  Women’s access to formal credit also reduces men’s participation in 
own farm work.   
For women in male-headed households, access to credit enables them to transition into self-
employment while reducing their involvement on the farm.  The higher returns to women’s labor attract 
women into off-farm self-employment from their work on the farm and serve to diversify the household’s 
income sources.  Although food security is an important goal for farm households in Malawi, it is also the 
case that landholdings are, on average, very small and the need exists for diversification into other 
enterprises.  Diversification of income sources helps the goal of achieving food security by increasing the 
purchasing power of households, so that they can also buy some of their food requirements in the market 
instead of relying solely on their farm output.  In many developing countries, diversification into off-farm 
wage employment is possible.  Unfortunately, in rural Malawi, few opportunities exist for off-farm formal 
wage employment and, hence, off-farm self-employment must be relied upon to provide the additional 
income.  Opportunities do exist to work as off-farm casual laborers (ganyu workers) during the peak 
agricultural season, to work at very low wages for cash or for food.  This, however, clashes with the 
household’s own farming activities, leading to low yields on-farm.   
An increase in women’s participation in income-generating self-employment activities is of 
interest because not only does it give them independent access to resources, but it also enables them to 
make a greater contribution to household income and welfare, thus possibly enhancing their status within 
the household.  This nexus between access to credit and women’s status and bargaining power likely has 
implications for other policy measures that aim to improve welfare measures such as the increased 
adoption of new technologies, lower fertility, and improved human capital investments.   
In female-headed households, access to credit does not seem to have a relationship with their self-
employment activity.  In part this result may reflect the small sample size of the data on female-headed 
households in the data set.  On the other hand, female-headed households are poorer on average than 
male-headed households and there may be a weaker link, if any, between their access to credit and their 
actual involvement in self-employment activity.  That is, they may have access to credit but be 
constrained by other barriers to being self-employed – these households may have less adult labor, for 
example.   
Men’s access to formal credit does not affect their participation in farm work or off-farm work, 
while their access to informal credit increases their participation in off-farm work.  Many men in rural   42 
Malawi work on their own farms and, therefore, access to formal credit that is directed toward providing 
agriculture inputs does not influence participation but likely affects work intensity and agricultural 
output.  The participation models do not reflect changes in the intensity of own-farm work as a result of 
access to formal credit targeted to the agricultural sector.  What is interesting is that since men do not 
have access to formal credit allowing them to move into off-farm self-employment, they use other ways 
of accessing funds.  Men appear to be moving into off-farm jobs only through their own informal credit 
access and perhaps through the formal credit access of their wives.  The latter has the effect of reducing 
their participation in own-farm work.  This suggests that men may also be looking for self-employment 
opportunities in an effort to reduce dependence on agricultural production as the principal income source.  
Malawi suffered two major droughts during the 1990s, in 1991-92 and in 1993-94, followed by a below-
average maize crop in 1994-95, thus making it very likely that men are also turning to the off-farm sector 
to help diversify household income sources and maintain basic food security.  Since formal credit to men 
is mainly in-kind agricultural credit, it cannot be used for off-farm economic activity, with the result that 
when they have access to credit through informal networks, they attempt to diversify.  Formal credit 
programs, at times of natural calamities that make agriculture non-profitable, may want to diversify their 
loan options to better serve poor households.  In fact, a more flexible approach by the credit programs that 
allows them to lend for off-farm activities during poor agricultural periods may also work to their own 
benefit by preventing a total loss on their loans to the farm households.   
The results suggest that formal credit programs that intended to target women for self-
employment are indeed engaging women in such activities.  The interesting effect of targeting women for 
self-employment is that men’s access into self-employment is now mainly through their wives.  This 
could be potentially problematic if men later ‘take over’ the enterprise from women, who will still have to 
bear the repayment burden of the loan.  In fact, this very issue has generated a fair amount of debate 
among researchers, with some studies reporting that women are worse off because they have lost ‘control’ 
of the loan and the enterprise, but have to repay the loan.  On the other hand, other studies contend that 
due to cultural values and traditions women may willingly not want to be at the forefront of the self-
employment activity, but still enjoy ‘control’ of the enterprise or an improvement in status within the 
household due to their access to formal credit (see Kabeer 2001 for an interesting discussion on this 
topic).  A more careful understanding of the behavior of rural households in Malawi is required before the 
results from this study can be extended to include issues of control over loans and the self-employment 
activity.   
As shown in other studies of off-farm employment in Africa, education in rural Malawi appears 
to be a differentiating characteristic between those working off-farm and those allocating time to farm 
work.  More education among men in Malawi encourages their participation in off-farm self-employment,   43 
whereas those men with less education are concentrated on farms.  However, this relation does not appear 
to be true where women are concerned:  education does not influence their labor allocation.  This suggests 
that women are engaging in low-skill self-employment activities where the level of education does not 
really make a difference.  While access to credit gives women the capital necessary for self-employment, 
it is likely that the self-employment options available to them are not varied.  This observation is also 
borne out from the descriptive analyses.  This is cause for concern because if returns to education for 
women in rural areas are very low, then investment in human capital is also likely to be affected, proving 
detrimental to long-term household welfare.   
Locational characteristics were found to be important in explaining participation in self-
employment activity.  In particular, a high population density and the consequent pressure on limited 
agricultural land encourage participation in off-farm self-employment activities.  It is also likely that the 
matrilineal system that is predominant in the southern region of Malawi (and to a lesser extent in the 
central region) helps women take better advantage of their opportunities.    
The results of the credit–expenditure models suggest that individual access to credit is important 
in determining household allocation patterns.  Furthermore, the impact of credit on household 
expenditures is also dependent on the sector of credit.  The results from the expenditure models do not 
unequivocally support the hypothesis that men spend more on items of personal consumption while 
women are more oriented towards children and household welfare.  While women in Malawi (spouses 
and heads) do seem to spend more on general household items (nondurables), health and education, men 
in Malawi are also spending less on adult goods when they have access to formal credit.  Female heads, 
on the other hand, increase the share of household expenditure on adult goods with access to formal 
credit.   
Men’s access to formal credit is predictably enhancing agricultural output, while for women 
formal credit is being directed towards health expenditures.  Interestingly, expenditures on health increase 
in all the models, except for female heads’ access to informal credit.  This suggests that health care is of 
primary concern and that additional income will be invested in that direction.  This result is of interest 
because of the long-term benefits that households can enjoy due to better health and in turn, increased 
productivity.  An interesting result is that child-related investments (education, clothing and accessories) 
are negatively affected by female head’s access to informal credit.  Combined with the results from the 
other equations in the models, it suggests that child-related investments are not yet a ‘priority’ area for the 
household.  As long as basic concerns like food security and minimum levels of welfare in the household 
are not addressed it is unlikely that investments in education and children will increase.   
It is reasonable to expect that women may make different consumption choices with nonlabor 
income (as in other studies that have shown a greater effect) than with credit.  Women in poor households  
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may be faced with a choice of whether to invest in the enterprise or utilize it towards household 
consumption.  If used towards household consumption, it is beneficial in the short term, but not 
necessarily in the long term.  If used for the self-employment activity, then credit will not make as much 
of an impact on household consumption patterns as might be expected.
1  This can potentially explain why 
credit is not affecting household consumption compared to previous studies that have estimated the 
impact of nonlabor income on consumption in the household.   
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 Table A1   Results of the multinomial logit model for predicting probability choices for the household, 
corrected for choice-based sampling (weighted-exogenous-sample maximum likelihood estimates)















Male-headed household (dummy variable) -0.037 -0.018 0.055
*
(-0.812) (-0.407) (1.823)
Head attended primary school (dummy variable) -0.010 0.036 -0.025
(-0.207) (0.731) (-0.971)








  and over 64 divided by total household size) (-5.641) (4.291) (2.444)








Share of value of livestock of total value of assets owned 0.678
*** -0.767
*** 0.089
   (4.277) (-5.254) (1.175)
Share of value of land of total value of assets owned  -0.060 -0.095 0.155
***
(-0.602) (-1.027) (2.988)
Continued on next page
t statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
membership status of the household
Marginal effects for
Independent variables
48Table A1   Results of the multinomial logit model for predicting probability choices for the household, 
corrected for choice-based sampling (weighted-exogenous-sample maximum likelihood estimates) 
continued
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Log likelihood function        -652.947
Restricted log likelihood      -796.262
Likelihood ratio statistic (?
2) 286.631
P value  0.0000
Likelihood ratio index (McFadden's pseudo R
2) 0.18
Number of observations 403
a:  Mangochi is omitted district;  t statistics are presented in parentheses.
*, **, ***
 represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Marginal effects for
membership status of the household
Independent variables
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